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* 
In this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can crea te as many firms as they like. I t 
is shown by means of two examples that under constant returns to scale, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria implies perfect 
competition. 
1. Introduction 
Sometimes large corporations create several firms which compete in the same market. There are, 
at least, three different explanations of this policy: 
(a) under decreasing returns production efficiency requires plant diversification, 
(b) competition alleviates incentive problems due to moral hazard, and 
(c) competing firms are a credible commitment to Stackelberg leadership of the group. 
In this paper we study the impact on market equilibrium of this kind of decentralization by mean s 
of two examples, focusing our attention on point (c) aboye. In order to keep effects (a) and (b) away 
we will as sume constant returns to scale and complete information. We also discuss briefly how 
econornies of scale can affect our conc1usions. 
In our conditions, it may be argued that no group would wish to set up more than one plant, since 
what it can be achieved by mean s of two plants can be achieved by one with superior coordination. 
We will see that the aboye conjecture is falseo In fact under linear or unit-elastic inverse demand 
functions perfect competition us the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium when the number of 
groups is at least three. The intuitive explanation of this paradox is that by creating a new firm a 
group can get c10ser to the Stackelberg point with this group as a leader, i.e. to crea te an independent 
firm is a credible commitment. In our model each group is in a Prisioner's dilemma-like situation 
since by increasing the number of firms makes itself better off but if all groups follow the same 
policy, profits per group will fallo In other words, decentralization of decisions - which implies that 
control over firms within the group is lost up to sorne extent - enhances group performance given the 
behavior of competitors. However if all groups follow the same policy, under constant returns, 
monopoly power vanishes. 
* I am grateful to C. Herrero, D. Pérez-CastrilIo, A. Villar and J. Silvestre for helpful comments. This research has been 
partialIy supported by D.G.I.C.Y.T. under project PB 88-0289. 
1
2. The model and the main results 
Suppose we have k corporations (subsequently called groups) in a market. Each group has access 
to an identical technology represented by a cost function c· Xi' where Xi is the output of a firm and e 
is the (constant) marginal cost. Each group can build as many (identical) firms as it likes. Each firm 
will be understood as a separate agent in the sen se that it will behave independently of the rest of 
firms in the group. Each group will attempt to maximize the overall profit received by all the firms in 
the group. 
There is an inverse demand function p = p (z) where z is total output produced by all firms of all 
groups, and p is the price of the product. If a group, say j, builds m firms and each of them 
produces an identical output X J' profits for this group are '/Tj = m . (p (z) . X J - e . X j ). 
The game is a two-stage game. In the first stage each group decides (independently) the number of 
firms in this group. In the second stage firms set (independently) the quantities to be produced. The 
equilibrium concept will be Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). We now study the 
properties of SPNE under additional assumptions on the inverse demand function. 
Example l. The inverse demand function reads p = Ajz, A> O. If in the second stage there are in 
firms, profits per firm in a Cournot Equilibrium (CE) are Ajn2. Therefore if a group sets up m firms 
its profits are m' Aj(m + t)2 where t is the number of firms created by its competitors (therefore 
n = m + t). In a SPNE each group will attempt to maximize this expression for given t. Forgetting 
the in ter problem, the first-ord~r condition is 
A.(t-m)j(m+t)3=O. 
Since it can be proved that this condition is also sufficient we obtain that in any SPNE m = t. 
Moreover since equilibrium is symmetrical t = (k - 1)· m. Therefore if k = 2 equilibrium is com-
pletely undetermined since any number of firms is a SPNE and if k> 2 equilibrium implies an 
infinite number of firms since the best reply of any group consists of building as many firms as the 
total number of firms set up by its competitors. Therefore in this case perfect competition is the 
unique SPNE. 
Example 2. Inverse demand reads p = a - z, a> e> O. If there are n firms in the second stage, 
profits per firm in a CE are (a - c)2j(1 + n)2. Therefore if a group sets up m firms its profits are 
m' (a - c)2j(1 + m + t)2. The first-order conditions of a SPNE is 
Since the condition is also sufficient we get that in any SPNE m = t + 1. Therefore if k> 1 only 
perfect competition is a SPNE since the best reply of each group is to set up one more firm than their 
competitors. 
Under economies of scale, in general, price will be greater than average cost. However we will 
show that if a fixed cost is considered, m is strictly decreasing with k, i.e. a small number of groups 
implies ceteris paribus a greater value of m. Let us denote by n' the maximum number of active 
firms subject to non negative profits in a CE. If p (z) is as in example 1 easy calculations show that 
m=n'. «k-2)jk 3 )1/2 (notice that if k=2 there is no SPNE and that m is maximum if k=3). 
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Then, if k> 3, dmjdk < O. If p (z) is as in example 2, m is the (unique if n' > O) solution to the 
equation (1 + n')2 . (1 + k· m - 2· m) = (1 + k . m )3. Implicit differentiation of this equation (when 
evaluated at equilibrium ) yields 
dmjdk = m· (1 + k· m - 3· m)j 
(2 . m . k - k - e . m - 1) < O if k ;:::.3. 
3. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown by means of two examples that under constant returos, strategic 
competition among a (possibly small) number of groups may yield perfect competition. Therefore in 
this case the existence of few groups does not necessarily imply that they are obtaining oligopolistic 
rents. Under economies of scale, profits will be positive but the smaller k, the greater m, i.e. if k is 
small, is very likely that more than one firm per group will be set. Of course, asymmetrical groups, 
moral hazard, heterogeneous products, and more general forms of demand and cost functions must 
be considered before a general conclusion is reached. What we have done in this letter is to isolate 
the effect of commitment via creation of firms in two special cases. 
Our results may be compared with those obtained by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) in the 
(polar) case of merger. They find that in the linear case merger may well be unprofitable. The 
difference with the findings of our paper is that in our case to crea te a new firm is always profitable. 
Therefore our results are not a counterpart of theirs. Moreover it is not clear that merger can be 
treated as non-cooperative game. See Perry and Porter (1985) and Davidson and Deneckere (1986) 
for further analysis of mergers. Finally we remark that other approaches to the delegation problem 
[see Vickers 1985), Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987)] obtain that, under linearity of the 
relevant functions and quantity competition, firms produce greater output under delegation than in a 
one-shot game. However in their case equilibrium is never perfectly competitive. This difference is 
explained by the fact that in their approach the first stage consists of choosing the reaction function 
of the firm and not, the number of firms in the group. An interesting extension of our work may be a 
combination of the two kinds of delegation. 
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